By Andrew Marshall and Erik de Castro
Battling an insurgency, wrote TE Lawrence, the legendary "Lawrence of Arabia" who fought in the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire almost a century ago, is "messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife."
This is a lesson of the U.S. military has learned painfully in Iraq, a war dragging into its fifth year with the rise in Iraqi and American lives. Piqué by setbacks, Washington this year installed a new commander, Major General David Petraeus, in charge of overseeing a new approach to combating the insurgency.
A few steps from the market, huge cranes lift concrete slabs to build a wall of protection for an American outpost in the center of town-a reversal of the old strategy of maintaining troops in large bases far from the centers urban.
The soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 10th Field Artillery Regiment, working with local councils and tribal leaders to support humanitarian projects and reconstruction, and ensure that they man checkpoints premises and monitor the area.
"We need to be closer to the people, among the people, and win their trust and working with them," said Lieutenant Colonel Mark Sullivan, the commander of the battalion. "We have a margin of safety that will allow the economy and services to develop."
It's a plan that comes from the American army in the new manual to combat the insurgency, whose authors are Petraeus with several experts in counter-insurgency.
One of the main messages of this manual is that the military must provide security for the population, because "citizens seeking to form alliances with groups that can guarantee their safety." Interdépendants military, economic and political initiatives should be put in place.
Echoing century Lawrence's warning that "Rebellions can be made by 2 percent active in a strike force, and 98 percent passively sympathetic," he said the important thing is to transform the local population against the insurgents in their midst.
The emphasis is on people over to win, not to kill. "Kill all insurgents is normally impossible, the manual says.
Nahrawan the recent past illustrates much of what has gone wrong in Iraq. Its future may reveal that the American military of the new strategy may not succeed in stabilizing the country.
Saddam Hussein moved thousands of Shiites here, making Nahrawan Shiite enclave surrounded by smaller Sunni Muslim communities. When Al-Qaeda militants blew up a Shiite shrine in Samarra in February 2006, Nahrawan became a battleground of fierce sectarian violence.
A few hours after the attack on the Sunni mosque, gunmen dragged 47 Shiites on a convoy of vehicles, shot in the head and thrown into a ditch. A week later, they killed 25 Shiites in a brick factory and four at a nearby power plant.
In the absence of American military presence in the region, local Shiites turned to the protection of the militia of the Mehdi Army of radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who accuses the United States of waging a war by proxy on American forces at the instigation of Iran.
When American forces began to arrive in the region this year as part of the wave, they face many attacks by Shiite militiamen and Nahrawan was virtually no-go zone. "It was overrun by militia Shiite extremists and criminals," said General Rick Lynch, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division.
U.S. troops moved in to detain the main militia leaders have begun to patrol the city, and save both economically and politically in place to try to improve the prosperity, good governance and security.
Now, says Sullivan, shops and businesses have reopened, the residents feel safe, and support for the Mehdi Army, which is observing a shaky truce ordered by Sadr - is ebbing away.
Hearts and minds
Enormous challenges remain. If you restart Sadr's militia hostilities in the database Nahrawan could be vulnerable, although Sullivan explained its position in the heart of town, shops and homes, will be less likely to insurgent attack.
The corruption and patronage is rampant and a lot of money disappears before reaching its intended projects. Local police, whose headquarters are right next to the new antenna, includes many supporters of the Mehdi Army.
Trying to arrest the leaders of the insurgents while winning the support of the population is a source of difficulties. Raids, with women and children are forced to leave their beds at night and looted homes, often because of the outrage in Iraq.
In a raid in Nahrawan, a girl crouching in a corner, shaking with terror. His mother pleaded with soldiers, saying his son were policemen, not insurgents.
Sullivan said that most Iraqis welcome Nahrawan in the raids, knowing that they are going to restore law and order. As the security situation improves, there will be people turning their backs on the rebellion, he argued.
Not everyone agrees.
"The soldiers kick in the doors of houses and digging through immediately even if there are women. Accordance with our traditions, it is definitely not acceptable," said Mehsin al Chainimi, 50, in his clothing store Nahrawan in the market.
"If they insist on kicking our doors, so to speak frankly, we will resist," he said.
Battling an insurgency, wrote TE Lawrence, the legendary "Lawrence of Arabia" who fought in the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire almost a century ago, is "messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife."
This is a lesson of the U.S. military has learned painfully in Iraq, a war dragging into its fifth year with the rise in Iraqi and American lives. Piqué by setbacks, Washington this year installed a new commander, Major General David Petraeus, in charge of overseeing a new approach to combating the insurgency.
A few steps from the market, huge cranes lift concrete slabs to build a wall of protection for an American outpost in the center of town-a reversal of the old strategy of maintaining troops in large bases far from the centers urban.
The soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 10th Field Artillery Regiment, working with local councils and tribal leaders to support humanitarian projects and reconstruction, and ensure that they man checkpoints premises and monitor the area.
"We need to be closer to the people, among the people, and win their trust and working with them," said Lieutenant Colonel Mark Sullivan, the commander of the battalion. "We have a margin of safety that will allow the economy and services to develop."
It's a plan that comes from the American army in the new manual to combat the insurgency, whose authors are Petraeus with several experts in counter-insurgency.
One of the main messages of this manual is that the military must provide security for the population, because "citizens seeking to form alliances with groups that can guarantee their safety." Interdépendants military, economic and political initiatives should be put in place.
Echoing century Lawrence's warning that "Rebellions can be made by 2 percent active in a strike force, and 98 percent passively sympathetic," he said the important thing is to transform the local population against the insurgents in their midst.
The emphasis is on people over to win, not to kill. "Kill all insurgents is normally impossible, the manual says.
Nahrawan the recent past illustrates much of what has gone wrong in Iraq. Its future may reveal that the American military of the new strategy may not succeed in stabilizing the country.
Saddam Hussein moved thousands of Shiites here, making Nahrawan Shiite enclave surrounded by smaller Sunni Muslim communities. When Al-Qaeda militants blew up a Shiite shrine in Samarra in February 2006, Nahrawan became a battleground of fierce sectarian violence.
A few hours after the attack on the Sunni mosque, gunmen dragged 47 Shiites on a convoy of vehicles, shot in the head and thrown into a ditch. A week later, they killed 25 Shiites in a brick factory and four at a nearby power plant.
In the absence of American military presence in the region, local Shiites turned to the protection of the militia of the Mehdi Army of radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who accuses the United States of waging a war by proxy on American forces at the instigation of Iran.
When American forces began to arrive in the region this year as part of the wave, they face many attacks by Shiite militiamen and Nahrawan was virtually no-go zone. "It was overrun by militia Shiite extremists and criminals," said General Rick Lynch, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division.
U.S. troops moved in to detain the main militia leaders have begun to patrol the city, and save both economically and politically in place to try to improve the prosperity, good governance and security.
Now, says Sullivan, shops and businesses have reopened, the residents feel safe, and support for the Mehdi Army, which is observing a shaky truce ordered by Sadr - is ebbing away.
Hearts and minds
Enormous challenges remain. If you restart Sadr's militia hostilities in the database Nahrawan could be vulnerable, although Sullivan explained its position in the heart of town, shops and homes, will be less likely to insurgent attack.
The corruption and patronage is rampant and a lot of money disappears before reaching its intended projects. Local police, whose headquarters are right next to the new antenna, includes many supporters of the Mehdi Army.
Trying to arrest the leaders of the insurgents while winning the support of the population is a source of difficulties. Raids, with women and children are forced to leave their beds at night and looted homes, often because of the outrage in Iraq.
In a raid in Nahrawan, a girl crouching in a corner, shaking with terror. His mother pleaded with soldiers, saying his son were policemen, not insurgents.
Sullivan said that most Iraqis welcome Nahrawan in the raids, knowing that they are going to restore law and order. As the security situation improves, there will be people turning their backs on the rebellion, he argued.
Not everyone agrees.
"The soldiers kick in the doors of houses and digging through immediately even if there are women. Accordance with our traditions, it is definitely not acceptable," said Mehsin al Chainimi, 50, in his clothing store Nahrawan in the market.
"If they insist on kicking our doors, so to speak frankly, we will resist," he said.
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